Abstract: This paper explores how U.S. bilateral economic aid has or has not changed with the advent of the War on Terror. In particular, has the renewed geopolitical role of aid coincided with a reduction of aid to the poorest countries or less weight on need in U.S. aid allocation decisions? We start with an analysis of annual U.S. aid budgets from 1955 to 2006. Controlling for domestic political and economic conditions, we find that the impact of the War on Terror on the aid budget is significantly larger than is immediately apparent. To explore how the emphasis on need may have changed over time, we use country-level panel data on aid allocations to 119 countries across the same time period. This shows that U.S. aid flows -for the poorest as well as other developing countries -increased with the War on Terror. However, after rising for 35 years, the emphasis placed on need has been falling steadily for core aid recipients during the War on Terror.
I. Introduction
Over the last two decades, U.S. foreign policy has been shaped by two spectacular events: the end of the Cold War and the start of the War on Terror. During the Cold War, short term foreign policy decisions driven by the State Department strongly influenced the U.S. aid program (Zimmerman 1993) . Anti-communist dictators such as Suharto in Indonesia, Marcos in the Philippines, and Mobutu in Zaire could count on substantial U.S. funding despite widespread corruption, human rights abuses, and often counterproductive domestic policies. In contrast, support for the poor, for emerging democracies, for developmental regimes, and for governments with good human rights records was inconsistent. Many analysts expected -or at least hoped -that the postCold War era would bring a long run peace dividend in the form of a reallocation of U.S. bilateral assistance with more focus on developmental or humanitarian objectives.
The attacks of September 11, 2001 , abruptly changed this expectation. In some high profile cases, aid reemerged as an important geopolitical tool for the State Department. Aid flows to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan skyrocketed, and many analysts presumed there would be a wholesale reversion to the Cold War pattern (e.g., Christian Aid 2004) . If so, the "inter-war period" (between the Cold War and the War on Terror) represents a brief hiatus, such that the future of U.S.
foreign aid can be seen as a return to something like its Cold War past (Buzan 2006) .
To identify systematic shifts in U.S. bilateral economic aid, we examine both the aggregate yearly aid budget and country-level aid allocations. In the aggregate analysis, we find that contemporaneous shifts in domestic politics have partly masked the impact of the War on Terror on aid. Over the 1955 to 2006 period, U.S. aid budgets typically have been lower under conservatives or divided governments, yet increased substantially with the advent of the War on Terror. The observed increase in aid since 9/11 can be decomposed into a decrease associated with the liberal-to-conservative shift in presidential administrations and a far larger increase specific to the War on
Terror time period.
We analyze panel data on country-level aid allocations for 119 countries over the same time period, excluding as atypical the two countries the U.S. invaded during the War on Terror:
Afghanistan and Iraq. Estimation results point to two continuing trends and one sharp reversal. The first continuing trend is in the probability that a country is "eligible" for U.S. aid, i.e., whether it receives U.S. aid or not. Starting in the mid 1990s and continuing into the War on Terror, the importance of need as a criterion for aid eligibility fell so that the probability that a higher income (less poor) developing country would receive aid increased over time and approached that for a lower income developing country. The second continuing trend is in the allocation of aid, i.e., how much aid a country receives. Also beginning in the mid 1990s, there are fairly steady and sizeable increases in the expected level of aid per country, especially notable for lower income countries.
The one sharp reversal relates to the allocation of aid among core aid recipients, countries that always receive U.S. aid. For the 35 years preceding the War on Terror, the weight given to need in the allocation of aid among these countries trended up. However, since the start of the War on Terror, the weight given to need has trended down rapidly. In short, the growth rate for U.S. aid to lower income core aid recipients has been positive but below that for higher income aid recipients. This paper brings together two branches of empirical research on the political economy of aid allocation. One branch focuses on changes in aid allocations from one era to the next. A number of papers examine how aid allocation changed with the end of the Cold War (e.g., Ball and Johnson 1996; Berthélemy and Tichit 2004; Boschini and Olofsgård 2007; Dunning 2004; Lai 2003; Meernik et al. 1998) ; some recent work explores changes since the start of War on Terror ).
The other branch investigates the effects of domestic politics on U.S. aid allocation (e.g., Fleck and Kilby 2006A; Goldstein and Moss 2005; Moss 2007 ). Our paper is the first to focus on identifying what components of the observed changes in aid budgets and allocations can be attributed to fundamental differences between the three eras -Cold War, inter-war, War on Terror -and what components of those changes can be attributed to other factors (e.g., economic changes, domestic politics).
Our paper is also the first to present a systematic econometric analysis of how the needorientation of aid has evolved from the end of the Cold War through the War on Terror. These findings are particularly important for the current academic and policy debates about foreign aid and international relations. For example, Lancaster (2000A, 2000B) , writing just prior to the War on Terror, expresses optimism that aid could become a more effective tool for both preserving peace and alleviating poverty. Yet more recently, Woods (2005) voices concern that the substantial expense of the War on Terror will come from diverting funds away from developmental purposes, and Buzan (2006) considers whether the War on Terror will turn out to be, in effect, like the Cold War. As we show, a careful econometric analysis is essential to identify how aid allocation patterns have evolved, especially because there have been important changes within the inter-war period and within the War on Terror period, not just between periods.
Section II reviews previous research on aid, the Cold War, and the War on Terror, looking first at the determinants of the size of aid budgets, then at factors influencing the allocation of the budget between developing countries. Section III turns to this paper's empirical analysis of the determinants of the size of the U.S. bilateral aid budget. Section IV presents panel analysis of the factors influencing the allocation of U.S. aid among countries. Section V concludes.
The authors argue that a divided government needs to satisfy a more diverse set of interests to pass 1 a budget and hence all elements of the budget, including aid, tend to increase. The link between divided government and larger aid budgets holds for a number of different definitions of government division: constitutional checks and balances, polarization within the ruling party, and strength of the opposition. Odedokun (2003) argues that these pressures may be less at the aid disbursement stage than at the budgeting stage.
One explanation of the divided government effect is that Congress does not trust an administration 2 from the other party to follow congressional preferences when distributing funds. Note that this contrasts with Odedokun's (2003, 2004) conclusions for a larger group of donors, perhaps because the U.S. does not have a parliamentary system.
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II. Previous Findings
Even the earliest econometric studies of donor aid budgets analyzed them as the outcome of a political process (Beenstock 1980; Mosley 1985) . Since then, many researchers have examined the effects of donor country partisan politics (e.g., Chong and Gradstein 2008; Imbeau 1989; Lumsdaine 1993; Noël and Thérien 1995; Stokke 1989; Thérien and Noël 2000; Thérien 2002; Tingley 2007) . In general, left-leaning governments tend to allocate more funds to development aid than do right-leaning governments. Recent work by Odedokun (2003, 2004 ) extends this literature, finding positive and significant estimated coefficients for the size of the military, the size of government, and having a divided government . For the G7 countries, however, they find no 1 partisan effect. Furthermore, G7 aid effort had a significant downward trend over time, but no separate post-Cold War decrease.
Two recent studies examine U.S. aid to Africa -from 1961 to 2000 in Goldstein and Moss (2005) and from 1961 to 2004 in Moss (2007) . In a time series analysis of real U.S. ODA to Africa, the authors find a significant negative effect of a divided U.S. government (when one party controls both chambers of Congress and the other the administration), a positive trend, and a negative Cold War effect . There is some indication that aid has been higher to Africa under Republicans, but the 2 variation within the period examined is not sufficient to draw firm conclusions. Boschini and Olofsgård (2007) examine the impact of the end of the Cold War on donor aid budgets using a panel of 17 donors from 1970 to 1997. They also examine the U.S. separately. In both cases, they find a positive partial correlation between aid budgets and Warsaw Pact/Russian military spending during the Cold War but no such correlation after the Cold War. The results suggest that the post-Cold War decline in aid could be linked to aid's reduced role as a geopolitical tool.
Despite the concern about the effects of the War on Terror on aid in the international relations literature (e.g., Woods 2005; Buzan 2006 ) as well as the economics literature, we have found no previous econometric studies of aid budget levels that examine the effects of the War on Terror. Thus, on this issue, our empirical analysis provides the first careful examination of the evidence.
Turning to the question of how aid is allocated among developing countries, the relevant literature is vast and spans the disciplinary boundaries of economics, political science, and international relations. Since Maizels and Nissanke (1984) , most studies include both recipient need and donor interest variables. Recipient need typically includes population, income, and, in more recent work, measures of democracy and human rights. Some studies consider additional humanitarian factors, but data availability places sharp limits on what is feasible. Donor interest variables broadly fall into geopolitical/strategic and economic/commercial categories. Commercial interests are most often captured by trade flows. Researchers have explored a variety of geopolitical variables, including UN voting variables, measures of alliances, military links, arms imports, aid from rival donors, geographically bordering a security threat, colonial ties with the donor, and a There is some but not universal agreement on the appropriate econometric specification. Trumbull 3 and Wall (1994) support using recipient country fixed effects, an approach now taken in many studies that do not focus on time invariant recipient characteristics. Studies often use logs to minimize the influence of outliers, improve the stability of results across specifications and samples, and simplify interpretation. Researchers, particularly those using annual data from individual donors, must deal with zeros (and hence log of zero) in the data for countries that receive no aid in a given year. With these considerations in mind, four approaches are typical: run a regression including the zeros (e.g., Ball and Johnson 1996 Berthélemy 2006 , Drury et al. 2005 , Meernik et al. 1998 ); or estimate a two part model (e.g., Berthélemy 2006 , Berthélemy and Tichit 2002 , Fleck and Kilby 2006A, Kilby 2006 , Neumayer 2003 6 common language with the donor.
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A number of previous aid allocation panel studies have examined or touched on the impact of the end of the Cold War. Ball and Johnson (1996) find that the significance of humanitarian factors in the allocation of U.S. food aid among African countries increased in the 1980s, a change they interpret as resulting from the Cold War winding down on that continent. The results in Meernik et al. (1998) indicate that security concerns (reflected in bordering a communist state or hosting U.S. troops) played a smaller role in determining whether or how much U.S. aid a country received after the Cold War. Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) find that overall bilateral aid declined with the end of the Cold War, switched from a bias toward low growth countries to a bias toward high growth countries, and gave less weight to civil and political liberties. In addition, colonial ties became less important while trade ties became more important. Boschini and Olofsgård (2007) explore how the allocation of aid among recipients changed with the end of the Cold War. Using Several other studies are worth noting. Kang and Meernik (2004) find that aid declined with the end 4 of Cold War, but also find higher aid in post-conflict situations and during political transitions. Drury et al. (2005) find that eligibility for U.S. disaster relief aid has changed since the end of the Cold War: countries that suffered disasters were more likely to qualify for U.S. relief aid during the Cold War, especially if they were U.S. allies. McGillivray (2005) examines time series data for a number of major aid recipients in Africa and finds aid allocation became more sensitive to economic policies in some recipient countries after the Cold War. Dollar and Levin (2006) compare five-year periods from 1984 to 2003 and find that, while U.S. bilateral aid became somewhat less responsive to democracy and poverty, it ceased favoring countries with poor economic institutions. 7 points to an increase in aid budgets, but no clear allocation effect. use OECD data, some use Greenbook data, e.g., Kuziemko and Werker (2006) , Meernik et al. (1998) . Greenbook data follow the government's fiscal year, which shifted from July 1 to October 1 in 1976. We incorporate a separately reported 1976 transition quarter by taking a re-scaled sum the two 1976 values. Given that U.S. development aid has long been recognized to be, in part, a tool for serving geopolitical interests, one obvious consideration is the link between war and aid. Indeed, many of the notable increases in the U.S. aid budget appear linked to U.S. involvement in foreign conflicts.
Following the literature on aid budgets and aid effort, we also might expect domestic economic and political factors to play a role. To explore these issues, we run regressions with the U.S. bilateral aid budget as the dependent variable. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics, and Appendix Table   A2 lists data sources.
The first variable in Table 1 , usaid, is the same as in Figure 1 . U.S. military spending may Pallage and Robe (2001) find that the amount of aid individual developing countries receive is 6 positively correlated with the global business cycle, suggesting that major donors are more generous when their economies are growing. A number of previous studies have considered the donor's fiscal balance (Beenstock 1980 , Boschini and Olofsgård 2007 , Hopkins 2000 , Mosley 1985 , Round and Odedokun 2003 ) with mixed results. We investigated this with the deficit to GDP ratio; this proved to be statistically insignificant.
The common space data are similar to the widely used congressional data generated by Poole and 7 Rosenthal's NOMINATE algorithm, a technique similar to factor analysis (Poole, 1998; Poole and Rosenthal 1997) . We generate average scores for the House and Senate for each Congress and then take the simple average of the two to summarize the location of the Congress as a whole.
Our fifty-two year sample includes 24 years of divided government. Eighteen of 32 years with To measure political shifts in the U.S., we include political variables that place the president and Congress along a liberal-conservative dimension using Poole's (1998 Poole's ( , 2007 12 declining trend (rather than the absolute level of the military budget) that predict aid budgets.
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Column 2 introduces the divided government dummy. The estimated coefficient for divided_gov is negative and statistically significant, mirroring Goldstein and Moss's (2005) results for U.S. aid to Africa. Ceteris paribus, the aid budget is $2.7 billion lower when one party controls the presidency and the other controls both chambers of Congress. As one might expect given the limited number of presidential administrations in the sample, there is a relatively large impact on the estimated president coefficient, which is cut almost in half. The congressional coefficient estimate is also reduced and growth is now significant. Another interesting change is that the coefficient estimate for inter_war becomes positive though it remains statistically insignificant. Very importantly, our main conclusions are not dependent on how we control for political shifts. First, regardless of whether it is liberal-conservative shifts or divided versus undivided government (or a combination of the two) that influences aid budgets, including controls for domestic political shifts is critical for uncovering how much other factors (such as geopolitical changes) have affected the quantity of aid. Second, the coefficient on the War on Terror variable
One important concern is sample selection bias introduced by limited data availability. For 14 example, Fleck and Kilby (2006B) find that availability of infant mortality data is correlated with U.S. trade and bilateral aid. Rosendorff and Vreeland (2006) also demonstrate the non-random nature of inflation and unemployment data availability. 13 differs little between the two specifications in Table 2 -nor does it change much when we use the alternative measure of divided government (mentioned in the previous paragraph).
IV. Panel Analysis of Country Allocations
This section examines the allocation of U.S. bilateral aid among potential recipient countries over time and how it changed with the end of the Cold War and the advent of the War on Terror.
As noted in Section II, a number of estimation methods are possible. We take an approach similar to Berthélemy (2006) . We first estimate a Heckman selection model and evaluate it by testing for independence of the equations. We also compare the estimated coefficients to those obtained by estimating each equation independently (a two part model without fixed effects). Finally, we introduce country fixed effects in the allocation equation.
Examining individual country allocations allows us to control for each country's humanitarian, commercial, and geopolitical characteristics. Because those raising concern over a "new Cold War" have charged that aid is less developmental now than prior to the War on Terror, our main focus will be on whether the need-orientation of U.S. aid allocation has changed. To explore this issue, we introduce interaction terms into a baseline specification to allow for changes in the relationship between aid allocations and recipient-country GDP.
The existing literature provides a wealth of additional candidate variables from which to choose, though we limit ourselves to those that do not unduly restrict the sample . We include a 14 number of variables to capture potential humanitarian factors in aid allocation. These include population, real PPP GDP per capita, the Polity combined autocracy/democracy score, and an
As a robustness test, we included a variable measuring the number of people killed in natural 15 disasters (EM-DAT 2007) . In some specifications, the variable enters with a positive, significant coefficient, but results are driven by a few outliers and its inclusion had virtually no impact on the reported results.
Other potential geopolitical variables include UN voting alignment and, at least since the start of 14 indicator for a political transition (derived from Polity codes). In keeping with much of the 15 literature, we include U.S. exports to capture commercial interests. To measure U.S. geopolitical interests, we include a dummy variable for countries receiving U.S. military aid (as in Boschini and Olofsgård 2007) . 16 Finally, we include the time-varying U.S. characteristics from Section III. These are the military budget (mil_budget), GDP growth (growth), the political location of the president (president) and Congress (congress), a divided government indicator (divided_gov), and time period dummies (inter_war and war_terror). As an alternative to this set of variables, we use year dummies in some specifications below.
Our data set covers 1955 to 2006, but we exclude Egypt, Israel, Iraq, Afghanistan, and transition economies as well as country-year observations that lack data. Appendix Table A1 lists the countries covered. We drop Egypt and Israel because their special relationship with the U.S. enshrined in the Camp David Accords has resulted in such high levels of aid that they could overwhelm other patterns in the data. Common practice in the aid allocation literature, this exclusion has some effect in specifications without fixed effects but little impact when country fixed effects are included. We exclude Iraq and Afghanistan for similar reasons, though in practice they
The country with the fewest observations is Qatar (1), followed by Cuba (12); the median is 44 17 observations per country. 15 lack basic macroeconomic data and cannot be included. We omit transition economies (and their Soviet Bloc predecessors) to avoid potentially confounding compositional effects; again, fixed effects specifications are not sensitive to this restriction. Table 3 to $52,272 (UAE 1981). As a measure of democracy, we use the previous year's value of the "polity2" variable from the Polity IV project. Running from autocracy (!10) to democracy (10), the sample mean is close to 0. Polity2 differs from Polity in that the former interpolates values during periods of transition (Polity code !88). The polity_transition variable equals 1 in these cases, in line with Kang and Meernik (2004) . Although all of these variables could arguably be used as proxies for the need for humanitarian aid, GDP per capita has the most direct link to poverty.
A number of cases with no U.S. exports recorded are dropped in this log specification (296 in the 18 selection equation and 164 in the allocation equation). Specifications using the level of exports and including these cases yield largely similar results. Tables 4-5 bilateral aid, ceteris paribus. The coefficient estimate implies that a ten percent higher GDP per capita is associated with a one percent lower probability of receiving aid. Countries receiving U.S. military aid are significantly more likely to receive economic aid; the estimated coefficient implies a 16 percent higher probability of receiving economic aid for the typical country if it also receives The above probability derivative (for ln_gdp) and probability differentials (for mil, inter_war, and 21 war_terror) are evaluated with all other variables set to the sample mean. In addition, there is an issue of collinearity between ln_pop and ln_exports in this estimation. The variables have a sample correlation of 0.51. We can reject weakly the joint hypothesis that both coefficients are zero (p=0.0999). In an estimation omitting either variable, the other enters with a positive and significant estimated coefficient.
All z-and t-statistics in
The small country bias remains if we use trade per capita rather than the level of trade, exclude very 22 small countries, exclude very large countries, or exclude both.
Results are essentially the same with a one or two year lag on exports. This argues against the 23 estimated coefficient being driven by substantial reverse causality (e.g., via tied aid), as do the relative magnitudes of aid and trade ($100 million versus $1.5 billion on average). 17 military aid. The odds of receiving aid were 5% higher in the inter-war period than during the Cold War, a change that is even more pronounced (9%) since the advent of the War on Terror.
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Turning to the allocation equation, more factors appear to be important. Populous countries received more aid, though a bias in favor of small countries in per capita terms (frequently noted in the literature) is evident since the estimated coefficient is significantly less than 1. Ceteris paribus, a one percent higher population is associated with about 0.2 percent higher aid and hence lower aid per capita . The negative and significant estimated coefficient for GDP per capita is again 22 consistent with a humanitarian motive. A one percent higher income is associated with about one percent lower aid. The recipient governance variables both enter as positive and significant. A one point higher polity score is associated with 3 percent higher aid while a one standard deviation higher polity score is associated with 23 percent higher aid. A political transition (either toward or away from democracy) predicts a 75 percent higher aid level. The estimated coefficient for U.S. exports is positive and significant; a one percent increase in U.S. exports to a country is associated with a 0.26 percent increase in aid . The geopolitical indicator mil also enters as significant in the 23 allocation equation: receiving U.S. military aid is linked to a doubling of U.S. economic aid.
Among the variables constant across countries, several are at least marginally statistically significant. As at the aggregate level, there is a positive and significant link between the U.S. A two part model is simply separate estimation of a selection equation (here via probit) and an 24 allocation equation (via least squares). For more on the two part model, see Cameron and Trivedi (2005: 544-546, 680-681). 18 military budget and aid; one percent more of the U.S. GDP directed to the military budget is associated with 16 percent higher aid. All three U.S. politics variables have the expected signs: the estimated coefficient for the president variable is negative though small in magnitude and statistically insignificant; the estimated coefficient for the congressional variable is negative and marginally significant; and the estimated coefficient for the divided government dummy negative, large in magnitude (associated with a 30 percent drop in the level of aid) and statistically significant.
The estimated inter-war coefficient is negative and large (a 23 percent fall in aid), but just misses the 10 percent significance level. Finally, the War on Terror coefficient is essentially zero.
There is little evidence of dependence between the selection and allocation equations. A Wald test fails to reject independence of the selection and allocation equations (p=0.4813). This is underscored by comparing the estimated coefficients of the Heckman selection model with the nearly identical estimates from the two part model presented in the next two columns.
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The final column of Table 4 estimates an allocation equation with country fixed effects. As one might expect, the introduction of fixed effects produces some changes in estimated coefficients.
These differences do not, however, cause any fundamental changes in the interpretations of the results. The estimated coefficient for population is no longer statistically significant; this makes sense because so much of the variation in population is between countries rather than over time. The income elasticity of aid (i.e., the responsiveness of aid to recipient GDP) increases slightly in magnitude. The estimated coefficient for receiving military aid is somewhat reduced though still large and statistically significant. The impact of the political orientation of Congress increases, with the estimated coefficient now statistically significant. Finally, the estimated coefficient for the interTests of statistical significance reject the null hypothesis that the effect of ln_gdp has been the same 25 over time. In particular, the effect during the War on Terror is different: the coefficient on ln_gdp*war_terror is marginally significant (p=.0600) and we can firmly reject the null hypothesis that interwar and War on Terror GDP coefficients are the same (p=.0053). Although when examined individually the period intercepts (inter_war and war_terror) do not show a statistically significant difference from zero (i.e., a difference from the Cold War era), they are statistically significantly different from each other (p=.0262). In addition, inter_war and its GDP interaction are jointly statistically significant, as are war_terror and its GDP interaction (p=.0356 and p=.0001, respectively).
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war period is smaller in magnitude and no longer significant.
Has aid become less focused on needy countries during the War on Terror?
We now turn to a major contemporary concern: has the degree to which aid targets needy countries declined as a result of the War on Terror? The logical way to begin is by examining between-period differences in the estimated effects of GDP per capita, the variable that most directly it t reflects need. To do this, we add two GDP interaction terms, ln_gdp *inter_war and it t ln_gdp *war_terror . Table 5 reports the results from a two part model with fixed effects in the allocation equation, parallel to columns 3 and 5 in Table 4 .
The selection equation in column 1 of Table 5 shows a decline over time in the magnitude of the negative estimated coefficient for GDP. The point estimates indicate that greater need (measured by lower GDP) leads to a higher probability of receiving aid in each period, but the size of this effect declines over time . As we explain in more detail below, the observed decline in need-25 sensitivity corresponds to an increase in the probability of wealthier countries receiving aid rather than a decrease in the probability of poor countries receiving aid.
Turning to the allocation equation in Table 5 , we see an increase over time in the magnitude of the negative estimated effects of GDP. For each period the point estimate of the effect of GDP indicates that greater need (measured by lower GDP) leads to a substantially higher funding level 
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(ceteris paribus), and the set of point estimates indicate that this effect becomes stronger over time .
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To determine what has happened to expected aid allocations, one must consider these interaction terms in conjunction with the time period dummies. If the coefficients on inter_war and war_terror were zero, the observed inter-temporal strengthening of the negative effects of GDP would indicate inter-temporally declining allocations for all aid-receiving countries. But paired with the positive estimated period dummy effects, the GDP coefficients imply cutoff levels: aid-receiving countries with GDP below the cutoff level experience a jump in expected aid allocations between periods, while those with higher GDP experience a fall in expected aid allocations. Compared to the Cold War, the predicted allocations will be (i) larger in the inter-war period for aid-receiving countries with ln_gdp below 7.64 (GDP below $2070 -one third of the sample in this period) and (ii) larger in the War on Terror period for those with ln_gdp below 8.24 (GDP below $3788 -45 percent of the sample in this period). All aid-receiving countries have a larger predicted allocation for the War on Terror than for the inter-war period.
Although we focus on the variation in the GDP coefficient across periods, the framework of Table 5 would also allow one to examine how the weights on other criteria vary across periods. The focus on GDP fits our primary interest: the changing role of need in aid allocations. Nevertheless, there remains a concern that imposing unchanging coefficients across time for the other variables could influence the GDP coefficient estimates. To check this, we estimated the model interacting the period dummies with all the explanatory variables that differ across countries (ln_pop, polity, polity_transition, ln_exports, mil) . Doing so does not substantially change the across-period pattern
When we re-estimate the equations in Table 5 with the country's percentage Muslim population   27 interacted with period dummies, the differences between the estimated coefficients for the inter-war period and the War on Terror period are small and not statistically significance (p=0.2733 for the selection equation; p=0.8727 for the allocation equation). The only substantial differences in the estimated effects of Muslim population are between the Cold War and the later periods (and only in the allocation equation). This clearly suggests the results are an artifact of the end of the Cold War rather than the start of the War on Terror.
The lower income threshold is $1,329 (similar to Uganda in 1999 or Tajikistan today) and the higher 28 income threshold is $7,976 (similar to Poland in 1987 or Thailand in 1996 .
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of GDP coefficients. Thus, the results are not an artifact of constraints imposed on other coefficients.
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To understand better how expected allocations have changed at lower and higher levels of GDP, we can use the results from Table 5 to compare predictions for different levels of GDP. For this discussion, we define lower income as ln_gdp one standard deviation below the sample mean and higher income as one standard deviation above the sample mean . All other characteristics of 28 these representative lower and higher income countries are kept the same, i.e., at the sample mean.
The results of this simulation are in Table 6 .
The numbers in Table 6A are based on the selection equation in Table 5 and allow us to examine the within-era effects of heterogeneity in GDP per capita on the probability of receiving aid. We find for each era a higher predicted probability of receiving aid for lower income than for higher income countries. For the Cold War period, the representative lower income country had a 0.965 probability of receiving U.S. bilateral aid, while the representative higher income country had a 0.701 probability. For the inter-war period, the probabilities are 0.984 and 0.823. And for the War on Terror period, they are 0.990 and 0.958.
Perhaps the most telling comparisons from Table 6A are those within income categories between eras. From the Cold War through the inter-war period to the War on Terror, the probability of a higher income country receiving aid increased from 0.701 to 0.823 to 0.958, while the probability for a lower income country increased from 0.965 to 0.984 to 0.990. Thus, although the likelihood of a higher income country receiving aid has increased over time, there is not a corresponding decrease in the likelihood of a lower income country receiving aid.
But what about the levels of aid among countries that receive aid? Table 6B is based on the allocation equation of Table 5 , column 2 and, consequently, pertains to the set of countries that receive aid. In each era, a representative lower income country would receive more aid than would a higher income country. For the Cold War era, the lower income country would receive 5.6 times the aid of the higher income country (with aid measured in real dollars). That multiplier rises to 12.2 in the inter-war period, then to 13.5 during the War on Terror. Furthermore, the growth in allocations over time has been positive for the representative lower income aid-receiving country:
the expected allocations are 26.6% higher for the inter-war period than for the Cold War, and 80.0%
higher for the War on Terror than for the Cold War. This differs from the experience for the representative higher income aid-receiving country: although it also experienced an increase from the inter-war period to the War on Terror, its inter-war allocation was 41.6% below that of the Cold War allocation, and its War on Terror allocation is 25.4% below its Cold War allocation. Before concluding, we conduct one final set of empirical experiments: examining year-toyear changes by estimating selection and allocation equations that include a full set of year dummies and annual GDP terms (year dummies interacted with ln_gdp). This serves two important purposes.
First, the use of period dummies and interactions (as in Table 5 ) cannot capture year-to-year changes within time periods and so may mask important intra-period policy shifts. Second, including a full set of year dummies addresses a potential concern that our time series variables (period dummies, the U.S. military budget share, and U.S. domestic political variables) are insufficient to capture general fluctuations in the overall level of aid. Figure 2 presents results in a form logically parallel to Table 6 .
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The top graph (2A) gives the probability of receiving aid by income level for each year. For the representative country with GDP set at the lower level, the probability of receiving aid is near one, consistent with our earlier results in Table 6 . With GDP set at the higher level, the probability has increased in recent years but not as a discrete jump at the onset of the War on Terror. Rather, the probability of receiving aid for a higher income country has been rising since 1997. aid to higher income countries in the 1960s. This was a time period with substantially fewer aid-receiving countries but, within this group, the spike is quite broad-based (not, for example, just a massive increase to Vietnam). These patterns demonstrate that the Cold War period (like the inter-war and War on Terror periods) was not homogeneous, but otherwise do not have a direct bearing on the issues we address here.
It is apparent, for example, when graphing the percent receiving aid for countries in the top 25% 32 of the annual income distribution.
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one with steady (for lower income countries) or increasing (for higher income countries)
probabilities of receiving aid.
The middle graph (2B) indicates the expected aid allocation for countries receiving aid. For the representative country with GDP set at the lower level, the expected allocation has increased substantially during the War on Terror, but again not as a discrete jump at the onset of the War on
Terror. Rather, a steep decline that started shortly after the end of the Cold War has been reversed and the allocation has been rising since 1996. For the higher income country, there has also been a rise during the War on Terror years -partially reversing a general decline since the mid 1960s -but the amounts (levels and dollar increases) are far smaller than for the lower income country (consistent with Table 6 ).
The bottom graph (2C) combines the selection and allocation equation results, presenting the ex ante expected allocation by income group. These predicted allocations are ex ante in the sense that they apply to all countries, not just those that end-up receiving aid. Again following the pattern that started midway through the inter-war period, we see rising expected aid allocations for lower income as well as higher income countries during the War on Terror.
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One concern raised by Figure 2A is the sharp increase in the number of higher income countries predicted to get aid in the later inter-war period and in the War on Terror. This pattern is mirrored in the actual data . These changes in sample composition could drive the apparent 32 increase in the responsiveness of aid to need, or even mask other changes, if the additional,
Note that the levels of aid are higher for the core aid recipients than for the unrestricted sample.
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For example, the 2006 value for lower income is nearly $140 million for core aid recipients as compared to about $100 million for all aid-receiving countries and for higher income is $20 million as compared to $6 million.
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relatively wealthy aid recipients each get very little aid. To address this, we look separately at countries that always receive U.S. bilateral aid (i.e., that get U.S. aid every year they appear in our sample). We call this group core aid recipients (see Appendix Table A1 for the list of countries). The top graph in Figure 3 demonstrates that the pattern for aid allocation found in Figure 2 holds for the core aid recipients. (Note we use the same variable values across simulations here, so that the only source of variation between Figure 3A and Figure 2B is differences in the coefficient estimates.) The representative country with GDP set at the lower level experiences a sharp decline in aid starting shortly after the end of the Cold War. Again, this pattern reverses after 1996. Also similar to Figure 2 , the representative core aid recipient with GDP set at the higher level also gains starting part way through the inter-war period.
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The lower graph (3B) gives the ratio of aid across income levels to highlight an important pattern in the upper graph. The numerator in the ratio is expected aid for the lower income level (the upper curve in Figure 3A) ; the denominator is expected aid for the higher income level (the lower curve in Figure 3A ). This is the same measure given in Table 6B . The ratio increased somewhat on the interactions between ln_gdp and each of the year dummies in the allocation equation). We present results as predicted levels and ratios of predicted levels to allow simultaneously for the impact of changing estimated coefficients on the year dummies.
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to get nearly twenty times more aid than an otherwise equivalent higher income country. Finally, the ratio falls precipitously after the start of the War on Terror. By the end of our sample in 2006, the ratio had fallen by two thirds, retreating to a level not seen since shortly after the end of the Cold War.
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This pattern of rising then falling responsiveness to income is hidden by a period-to-period approach. The estimations in Table 5 correctly find that U.S. bilateral aid was more responsive to need in both later periods as compared with the Cold War period. What the estimates fail to show is that these period averages were the outcome of rising and then falling responsiveness to need, particularly for the core aid recipients. The graphs demonstrate that, in terms of U.S. bilateral aid allocations, poorer countries have fared better since the start of the War on Terror because they receive more aid than during either the Cold War or the inter-war period ( Figures 2C and 3A) . But at the same time, the War on Terror period corresponds to an apparent policy shift that has placed less and less emphasis on need (at least among core aid recipients) so that, ceteris paribus, percentage increases in aid to better-off countries outstripped those to poorer countries ( Figure 3B ).
V. Conclusion
The advent of the War on Terror and the leadership of the George W. Bush administration have clearly reshaped and refocused many aspects of U.S. foreign policy. There is considerable concern in the development community that the renewed importance of foreign aid as a geopolitical tool has undermined -or will undermine -the development orientation of aid. Terror, there was a clear upward trend in the weight given to need in the allocation of aid to core recipients. In the years since, the weight given to need has decreased rapidly and steadily. With the general increase in aid, thus far the decreased weight on need has merely slowed the growth of U.S.
aid to poorer countries rather than actually reducing aid levels. But if this policy shift away from need outlives the general increase in the aid budget, U.S. aid to the poorest developing countries will decrease. Table 5 , evaluated at sample means with: lower income = sample mean of ln_gdp ! one standard deviation higher income = sample mean of ln_gdp + one standard deviation PPP GDP per capita in constant 2006 dollars.
